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arises if the investment good sector has increasing social returns, provided the consumption
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has increasing social returns.
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1 Introduction
The existence of local indeterminacy in infinite-horizon models with exter-
nalities is a well established fact.1 As initially shown by Benhabib and
Farmer [2], this conclusion is generally a consequence of large enough in-
creasing returns at the social level, a large enough elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution in consumption and a large enough elasticity of the labor
supply.2 It is worth noticing however that all these contributions deal ei-
ther with an agregate model or with a two-sector model characterized by
identical technologies at the private level.
As increasing returns do not clearly appear to be supported by empirical
evidences,3 Benhabib and Nishimura [5] have shown in a seminal contribu-
tion that local indeterminacy is also compatible with constant returns at the
social level in a two-sector model with sector-specific externalities. Assum-
ing a linear utility function with respect to consumption, they have proved
that this result is based on a capital intensity reversal, the consumption good
being capital intensive at the private level but labor intensive at the social
level. More interestingly, this result is established without any restriction
on the elasticity of labor supply.4
Generalizing the Benhabib-Nishimura formulation by the consideration
of a non-linear utility function with respect to consumption, Nishimura and
Venditti [16] and Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] have shown that while
local indeterminacy is fundamentaly based on a large elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption, it requires a low enough elasticity of the
labor supply. Moreover, they have proved that saddle-point stability is en-
sured as soon as the elasticity of the labor supply is large enough. Clearly,
this last conclusion appears to be in complete opposition with the results
derived under increasing social returns within aggregate or two-sector mod-
1See Benhabib and Farmer [4] for a survey of the literature.
2See also among others Benhabib and Farmer [3], Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti
[6], Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [14], Pintus [17], Wen [18].
3See Basu and Fernald [1].
4See also Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [6].
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els. Our goal in the present paper is to understand such a drastic difference
between the two formulations. We will then precisely examine the role of
returns to scale on the occurrence of local indeterminacy.
We consider a two-sector model with Cobb-Douglas technologies, sector-
specific externalities, endogenous labor and a non-linear separable CES util-
ity function. Contrary to the Benhabib and Farmer [3] formulation, we
consider different technologies at the private level (the capital intensity dif-
ference at the private level is non zero) in order to deal with a more gen-
eral model. Moreover, we assume that one of the two sectors has constant
social returns to scale while the other sector is characterized by constant
returns either at the private or at the social level. Proceeding that way,
we get a framework compatible with both the Benhabib-Farmer [3] and the
Benhabib-Nishimura [5] formulations.
We first show that when labor is inelastic, for any of the two configu-
rations for the returns to scale, local indeterminacy is obtained under the
same type of condition exhibited by Benhabib and Nishimura [5], namely
a capital intensity reversal between the private and the social levels. We
then clearly establish the robustness of this condition in particular when the
social returns to scale are increasing.
Second, we prove that when labor is infinitely elastic, saddle-point sta-
bility is obtained as soon as the investment good sector has constant social
returns. On the contrary, if the investment good sector has increasing social
returns, local indeterminacy may arise provided the consumption good is
labor intensive at the social level and the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution in consumption admits intermediary values. Considering these two
results simultaneously we finally prove that local indeterminacy requires a
low elasticity of labor when the investment good has constant social re-
turns, but requires either low enough or large enough elasticity of labor
when the investment good has increasing social returns. More generally, we
show that when mild externalities, i.e. weakly increasing social returns in
the investment good sector, are considered, local indeterminacy is ruled out
for intermediary values of the elasticity of labor supply. To summarize, we
show that the drastic difference between the Benhabib-Farmer [3] and the
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Benhabib-Nishimura [5] formulations fundamentaly relies on the returns to
scale at the social level in the investment good sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
model, the intertemporal equilibrium, the steady state and the characteristic
polynomial. The main results are exposed in Section 3. Some concluding
comments are provided in Section 4 and a final Appendix contains all the
proofs.
2 The model
2.1 The production structure
We consider an economy producing a pure consumption good y0 and a pure
capital good y1. Each good is assumed to be produced by capital x1j and
labor x0j , j = 0, 1, through a Cobb-Douglas technology which contains
sector specific externalities. The representative firm in each industry indeed
faces the following technology, called private production function:
yj = x
β0j
0j x
β1j
1j ej(X0j , X1j), j = 0, 1 (1)
with βij > 0. The positive externalities are equal to
ej(X0j , X1j) = X
b0j
0j X
b1j
1j
with bij ≥ 0 and Xij denoting the average use of input i in sector j. We
assume that these economy-wide averages are taken as given by each indi-
vidual firm. At the equilibrium, since all firms of sector j are identical, we
have Xij = xij and we may define the social production functions as follows
yj = x
βˆ0j
0j x
βˆ1j
1j (2)
with βˆij = βij + bij . In order to consider mild external effects and to
avoid endogenous growth, we will assume that βˆij < 1, i, j = 0, 1. We do
not a priori impose any restriction on the returns to scale at the private
and social levels. However, we will be interested in the analysis of two
standard configurations: a first one with constant social returns and thus
decreasing private returns, a second one with constant private returns and
thus increasing social returns. Total labor is given by ` = x00+x01, and the
total stock of capital is given by x1 = x10 + x11.
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Choosing the consumption good as the numeraire, i.e. p0 = 1, a firm in
each industry maximizes its profit given the output price p1, the rental rate
of capital w1 and the wage rate w0. The first order conditions subject to
the private technologies (1) give
aij ≡ xij/yj = pjβij/wi, i, j = 0, 1 (3)
We call aij the input coefficients from the private viewpoint.
Considering that the total labor is given by ` = x00 + x01, and the
total stock of capital is given by x1 = x10 + x11, the factor market clearing
equation is directly obtained from the private input coefficients as defined
by (3):
Lemma 1. Denote x = (`, x1)′, y = (y0, y1)′ and A = [aij ] ≡ [pjβij/wi].
Then Ay = x.
Using the fact that the input coefficients form the private viewpoint aij are
functions of w and p, i.e. aij = pjβij/wi = aij(wi, pj), a total differenciation
of the above factor market clearing equation gives:
Lemma 2. Denote dx = (d`, dx1)′ and dy = (dy0, dy1)′. Then
dx = Ady +

[
∂a00
∂w0
y0 + ∂a01∂w0 y1
]
dw0 + ∂a01∂p1 y1dp1[
∂a10
∂w1
y0 + ∂a11∂w1 y1
]
dw1 + ∂a11∂p1 y1dp1
 (4)
From (3) we get pj = aijwi/βij or equivalently pj βˆij = aijwi(βˆij/βij).
Let us then define
aˆij =
βˆij
βij
aij (5)
We get pj βˆij = aˆijwi, and taking the sum over i gives the price equation
p =
 1βˆ00+βˆ10 0
0 1
βˆ01+βˆ11
 Aˆ′w (6)
with p = (1, p1)′, w = (w0, w1)′ and Aˆ = [aˆij ]. We will call aˆij the input co-
efficients from the social viewpoint.5 Substituting the first order conditions
5If the agents take account of externalities as endogenous variables in profit maximiza-
tion, the first order conditions subject to the social technologies (2) give these social input
coefficients.
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(3) into the social production function (2) and solving for pj gives an ex-
pression of the input coefficients from the social viewpoint aˆij as a function
of w and y:
aˆij = (βˆij/wi)y
1−βˆ0j−βˆ1
βˆ0j+βˆ1j
j (βˆ0j/w0)
βˆ0j
βˆ0j+βˆ1j (βˆ1j/w1)
βˆ1j
βˆ0j+βˆ1j
Substituting this expression into (6) gives the factor-price frontier:
Lemma 3. Denote p = (1, p1)′. Then:
p =
 y
1−βˆ00−βˆ10
βˆ00+βˆ10
0 0
0 y
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
βˆ01+βˆ11
1


(
w0
β00
) βˆ00
βˆ00+βˆ10
(
w1
β10
) βˆ10
βˆ00+βˆ10
(
w0
β01
) βˆ01
βˆ01+βˆ11
(
w1
β11
) βˆ11
βˆ01+βˆ11
 (7)
Using the fact that the input coefficients from the social viewpoint aˆij are
functions of w and y, a direct differenciation of the factor-price frontier gives:
Lemma 4. Denote dp = (0, dp1)′ and dw = (dw0, dw1)′. Then
dp =
 1βˆ00+βˆ10 0
0 1
βˆ01+βˆ11
 Aˆ′dw +
 1−βˆ00−βˆ10βˆ00+βˆ10 1y0dy0
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
βˆ01+βˆ11
p
ydy1
 (8)
Notice that the first term on the right-hand-side is obtained from the equiv-
alence between (6) and (7).
Solving equations (4) and (8) with respect to dy and dw allows to com-
pute the partial derivatives [dy/dx], [dy/dp], [dw/dx] and [dw/dp] (see Ap-
pendix 5.2 for details). In the following we will then treat y and w as func-
tions of x and p, namely yj = y˜j(x1, `, p1) and wj = w˜j(x1, `, p1), j = 0, 1.6
2.2 Intertemporal equilibrium and steady state
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived
agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population
6Notice that if the returns to scale are constant at the social level, then 1−βˆ0j−βˆ1j = 0
and the factor prices w are functions of the output price only, i.e. wj = wj(p1), j = 0, 1.
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is constant and normalized to one. At each period a representative agent
supplies elastically an amount of labor ` ∈ (0, ¯`), with ¯`= 1 his endowment
of labor. He then derives utility from consumption c and leisure L = 1 − `
according to the following function
u(c, `) = c
1−σ
1−σ − `
1+γ
A(1+γ)
with σ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and A a normalization constant. The elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution in consumption is thus given by c = 1/σ while the
elasticity of the labor supply is given by ` = 1/γ. Considering the exter-
nal effects (e0, e1) as given, profit maximization in both sectors described in
Section 2.1 gives demands for capital and labor as functions of the capital
stock, the production level of the investment good, total labor and the ex-
ternal effects, namely x˜ij = xij(x1, y1, `, e0, e1), i, j = 0, 1. The production
frontier is then defined as
c = T (x1, y1, `, e0, e1) = x˜
β00
00 x˜
β10
10 e0
From the envelope theorem we easily get w1 = T1(x1, y1, `, e0, e1), p1 =
−T2(x1, y1, `, e0, e1) and w0 = T3(x1, y1, `, e0, e1).
The intertemporal optimization problem of the representative agent can
be described as:
max
{x1(t),y1(t),`(t)}
∫ +∞
0
[
T (x1(t), y1(t), `(t), e0(t), e1(t))1−σ
1− σ −
`(t)1+γ
A(1 + γ)
]
e−δtdt
s.t. x˙1(t) = y1(t)− gx1(t)
x1(0) given
{ej(t)}t≥0, j = 0, 1, given
where δ ≥ 0 is the discount rate and g > 0 is the depreciation rate of the
capital stock. We can write the modified Hamiltonian in current value as:
H = T (x1(t), y1(t), `(t), e0(t), e1(t))
1−σ
1− σ −
`(t)1+γ
A(1 + γ)
+ q1(t) (y1(t)− gx1(t))
with q1(t) the Lagrange multiplier which corresponds to the utility price of
capital in current value. The necessary conditions for a solution of the above
dynamic optimization problem are given by the following equations:
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q1(t) = p1(t)c(t)−σ (9)
`(t)γ/A = w0c(t)−σ (10)
x˙1(t) = y1(t)− gx1(t) (11)
q˙1(t) = (δ + g)q1(t)− w1(t)c(t)−σ (12)
As shown in Section 2.1, we have in the general case w0 = w˜0(x1, `, p1) and
c = y˜0(x1, `, p1) = T (x1, y˜1(x1, `, p1), `, e0(x1, `, p1), e1(x1, `, p1)). There-
fore, solving equation (10) describing the labor-leisure trade-off at the
equilibrium, we may express the labor supply as a function of the cap-
ital stock and the output price, ` = `(x1, p1). Then, we get y0 =
c(x1, p1) ≡ y˜0(x1, `(x1, p1), p1), y1 = y1(x1, p1) ≡ y˜1(x1, `(x1, p1), p1) and
w1 = w1(x1, p1). Considering (9)-(12), the equations of motion are finally
derived as
x˙1 = y1(x1, p1)− gx1
p˙1 = 1E(x1,p1)
[
(δ + g)p1 − w1(x1, p1) + σ p1c(x1,p1) ∂c∂x1 (y1(x1, p1)− gx1)
] (13)
with
E(x1, p1) = 1− σ p1c(x1,p1) ∂c∂p1 (14)
Notice that E(x1, p1) is equal to 1 minus the product of the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption by the elasticity of
the consumption good’s output with respect to the price of the investment
good.
Any solution {x1(t), p1(t)}t≥0 that also satisfies the transversality con-
dition
lim
t→+∞ e
−δtp1(t)x1(t) = 0
is called an equilibrium path.
A steady state is defined by a pair (x∗1, p∗1) solution of
y1(x1, p1) = gx1
w1(x1, p1) = (δ + g)p1
(15)
In order to simplify the analysis, we use the normalization constant A which
enters the utility function in order to choose a particular value for the steady
state labor supply. We get the following result:
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Proposition 1. There is a unique value A∗ > 0 such that when A = A∗,
there exists a unique steady state (x∗1, p∗1) > 0 with `∗ = `(x∗1, p∗1) = l¯ ∈
(0, 1). Moreover, the expressions (x∗1, p∗1) do not depend on the preference
parameters σ and γ.
The nice feature of this normalization is that the normalized steady state
will remain constant while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption or the elasticity of the labor supply are varied. This will allow
to provide a clear analysis of the local stability properties of the equilibrium
path.
2.3 Characteristic polynomial
Linearizing the dynamical system (13) around (x∗1, p∗1) gives:
J =
 ∂y1∂x1 − g ∂y1∂p1
1
E
[
σ
p∗1
c∗
∂c
∂x1
(
∂y1
∂x1
− g
)
− ∂w1∂x1
]
1
E
[
δ + g − ∂w1∂p1 + σ
p∗1
c∗
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
]
 (16)
As we show in Appendix 5.2, all these partial derivatives are functions of σ
and γ. The role of γ of course occurs through the presence of endogenous
labor but remains implicit at that stage mainly because of our methodology
to derive the dynamical system (13) from the first order conditions (9)-(12).
Any solution from (13) that converges to the steady state (x∗1, p∗1) satisfies
the transversality condition and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given x1(0), if
there is more than one initial price p1(0) in the stable manifold of (x∗1, p∗1),
the equilibrium path from x1(0) will not be unique. In particular, if J
has two eigenvalues with negative real parts, there will be a continuum of
converging paths and thus a continuum of equilibria.
Definition 1. If the locally stable manifold of the steady state (x∗1, p∗1) is
two-dimensional, then (x∗1, p∗1) is said to be locally indeterminate.
The eigenvalues of J are given by the roots of the following characteristic
polynomial
P(λ) = λ2 − T λ+D (17)
with
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D(σ, γ) = 1E
{(
∂y1
∂x1
− g
)(
δ + g − ∂w1∂p1
)
+ ∂y1∂p1
∂w1
∂x1
}
T (σ, γ) = 1E
{
∂y1
∂x1
+ δ − ∂w1∂p1 + σ
p∗1
c∗
[
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
− ∂c∂p1
(
∂y1
∂x1
− g
)]} (18)
(See Appendix 5.2 for the detailed expressions of these derivatives). Local
indeterminacy requires therefore that D(σ, γ) > 0 and T (σ, γ) < 0.
Notice from Appendix 5.2 that if constant social returns to scale are
assumed in both sectors then ∂w1/∂x1 = 0 and the Determinant and Trace
are equal to the expressions obtained by Benhabib and Nishimura [5] with
σ = 0 or by Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] with σ > 0.
3 Main results
Our main objective is to study the role of returns to scale at the private
and social levels on the local determinacy properties of the long-run equilib-
rium. In order to simplify the analysis and to consider a framework as close
as possible to the formulations of Benhabib and Farmer [3], Harrison [11],
Harrison and Weder [12], when one sector will be characterized by increas-
ing social returns, we will assume that the other sector has constant social
returns.
We will build the analysis by considering two polar cases. In the first
case we assume a linear utility function with respect to labor, i.e. an infinite
elasticity of the labor supply (γ = 0). In the second case we consider the
model with inelastic labor (γ = +∞). We will finally derive conclusions for
the general case with γ ∈ (0,+∞).
3.1 Local indeterminacy with inelastic labor supply
When the utility function is non-linear with respect to consumption, i.e.
σ > 0, and γ = +∞, we get a formulation with inelastic labor in which
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ
since ` ∈ (0, 1) and limγ→+∞ `1+γ/(1 + γ) = 0.
As initially shown by Benhabib and Nishimura [5], the local indetermi-
nacy properties within two sector models are based on the capital intensity
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difference across sectors at the private and social levels. Using the defini-
tions of input coefficients given in Section 2.1 allows to characterize these
capital intensity differences as follows:
Definition 2. The consumption good is said to be:
i) capital intensive at the private level if and only if a11a00−a10a01 < 0,
ii) capital intensive at the social level if and only if aˆ11aˆ00− aˆ10aˆ01 < 0.
We may conveniently relate these input coefficients to the Cobb-Douglas
parameters:7
Proposition 2. At the steady state:
i) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the private per-
spective if and only if
b ≡ 1− β10β01β00β11 < (>)0
ii) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the social per-
spective if and only if
bˆ ≡ 1− βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ00βˆ11
< (>)0
Under constant social returns in both sectors and a linear utility function
with respect to consumption (σ = 0), Benhabib and Nishimura [5] have
proved that local indeterminacy arises if the consumption good is capital
intensive from the private perspective (b < 0), but labor intensive from
the social perspective (bˆ > 0). Building on the same kind of technological
restrictions, we obtain the following conclusions:
Theorem 1. Let γ = +∞ and consider the critical value
σˆ = − b(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]
βˆ00(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)] (19)
Then the following results hold:
i) When both sectors are characterized by constant social returns, i.e.
1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0, the steady state is locally indeterminate
if and only if
7See Benhabib and Nishimura [5].
10
b < 0, bˆ > 0 and σ ∈ [0, σ∗)
with σ∗ = σˆ.
ii) When the investment good sector is characterized by constant social
returns, i.e. 1− βˆ01− βˆ11 = 0, while the consumption good sector is charac-
terized by increasing social returns, i.e. 1− βˆ00− βˆ10 < 0, there exists g¯ > 0
such that the steady state is locally indeterminate if
b < 0, bˆ > − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β11b)]
βˆ00[δ+g(1−β11)] , g ∈ (0, g¯) and σ ∈ [0, σ
∗)
with
σ∗ = σˆ − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[βˆ01(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ11[δ+g(1−β11b)]]
βˆ00(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)]
(20)
iii) When the investment good sector is characterized by increasing so-
cial returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 < 0, while the consumption good sector is
characterized by constant social returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0, the steady
state is locally indeterminate if
b < (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(1−βˆ11)g , bˆ > 0 and σ ∈ [0, σ
∗)
with
σ∗ = σˆ − δ+g(1−β11)g (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)[δ+g(1−βˆ10β11b)][βˆ00(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)]]β11 (21)
Notice that all the three configurations require the same restriction on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, namely εc = 1/σ
needs to be larger than the inverse of the elasticity of the consumption good’s
output with respect to the price of the investment good, i.e. εc > 1/σ∗ =
(p∗1/c∗)(∂c/∂p1). This restriction implies thus that E(x∗1, p∗1) > 0. However,
increasing returns at the social level allow to get local indeterminacy with
lower values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
than in the case with constant social returns. As the consumption good is
assumed to be capital intensive at the private level, i.e. b < 0, we have
indeed in ii) and iii), σ∗ > σˆ.
Theorem 1 provides for the first time in the literature a general analysis of
local indeterminacy in a real two-sector model with increasing social returns.
Indeed, all the previous contributions dealing with increasing social returns
were derived from Benhabib and Farmer [3] in which the technologies of both
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sectors are identical at the private level, i.e. in our notations b = 0.8 Within
such a framework, the technological conditions for local indeterminacy are
not related to capital intensity differences across sectors. It follows that
comparisons with contributions dealing with constant returns to scale at
the social level such as Benhabib and Nishimura [5] or Garnier, Nishimura
and Venditti [8] were difficult to obtain. Theorem 1 then shows that the
social returns to scale being constant or increasing, local indeterminacy is
fundamentaly obtained if there is a capital intensity reversal between the
private and the social levels and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption is large enough.
3.2 Local indeterminacy with infinitely elastic labor supply
When the utility function is non-linear with respect to consumption and the
labor supply is infinitely elastic, i.e. σ > 0 and γ = 0, we get
u(c, `) = c
1−σ
1−σ − `
As shown in Benhabib and Farmer [2], Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti
[13], Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [14] or Pintus [17], the occurrence
of local indeterminacy in aggregate models requires the consideration of
a large enough (close to infinite) elasticity of the labor supply. Such a
restriction is also necessary in two-sector models derived from Benhabib
and Farmer [3] in which the technologies of both sectors are identical at
the private level (b = 0) and the returns to scale are increasing at the
social level. However, as we have shown with Theorem 1, two-sector models
provide a framework in which local indeterminacy arises through different
channels than aggregate models where the intertemporal allocations of labor
play a crucial role. Indeed, in a multi-sector framework, the existence of a
continuum of equilibria is based on intertemporal reallocations of productive
factors between sectors and is fully compatible with inelastic labor, the
returns to scale being constant or increasing at the social level.
Of course, an infinite number of equilibria may also occur within a two-
sector model with elastic labor. The following Theorem then provides an
8See Harrison [11], Harrison and Weder [12].
12
analysis of local indeterminacy with an infinitely elastic labor supply. We
show that the results fundamentaly depend on the properties of the sectoral
returns to scale at the social level.
Theorem 2. Let γ = 0. Then the following results hold:
i) When the investment good sector is characterized by constant social
returns, i.e. 1− βˆ01− βˆ11 = 0, the steady state is saddle-point stable for any
σ ≥ 0.
ii) When the investment good sector is characterized by increasing social
returns, i.e. 1− βˆ01− βˆ11 < 0, while the consumption good sector is charac-
terized by constant social returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0, there exist  > 0,
σ > 0 and σ¯ > σ such that the steady state is locally indeterminate if
βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), bˆ ∈
(
− (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
βˆ11β11g
, βˆ01β11δ
βˆ00βˆ11(δ+g)
)
and σ ∈ (σ, σ¯)
In case i), saddle-point stability is obtained for any type of social returns
to scale in the consumption good sector, i.e. either when 1− βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0
or when 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 < 0. As shown in Appendix 5.4, it is also worth
noticing that the conditions for local indeterminacy in case ii) imply that
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is lower than
the elasticty of the consumption good’s output with respect to the price of
the investment good, i.e. E(x∗1, p∗1) < 0. Actually, we can show that when
small externalities are considered, local indeterminacy is ruled out as soon
as E(x∗1, p∗1) > 0.
Proposition 3. Let γ = 0, bˆ > 0 and consider E(x1, p1) as defined by (14).
There exists  > 0 such that if βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ) and σ is fixed so as to
imply E(x∗1, p∗1) > 0, then D(σ, 0) < 0 and local indeterminacy is ruled out.
Theorem 2 shows that as soon as the investment good sector is character-
ized by constant social returns, the steady state is necessarily saddle-point
stable for any value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption and any amount of external effects. This result explains why local
indeterminacy is ruled out in two-sector models with constant social returns
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to scale in both sectors and large values for the elasticity of the labor supply.9
On the contrary, when the investment good sector is characterized by
slightly increasing social returns and is capital intensive at the social level,
local indeterminacy arises for intermediary values of the social capital inten-
sity difference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion. Notice that there is no particular restriction on the capital intensity
difference at the private level. This fact suggests that our conclusions are
compatible with two-sector models in which the private technologies are
identical across sectors, i.e. b = 0, as in Benhabib and Farmer [3], Harrison
[11], Harrison and Weder [12]. Notice also that our conclusions hold with al-
most constant social returns to scale and thus extremely small externalities
in the investment good sector.
3.3 Local indeterminacy with elastic labor supply
Building on Theorems 1 and 2, we may now provide a complete picture
of the existence of local indeterminacy depending on the properties of the
social returns to scale in both sectors.
Theorem 3. Let γ ∈ [0,+∞). The following results hold:
i) When both sectors are characterized by constant social returns, i.e.
1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0, consider σ∗ = σˆ as defined by (19) in
Theorem 1. Then for any σ ∈ [0, σ∗), there exists a bound γ(σ) > 0 such
that the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if
b < 0, bˆ > 0
and γ > γ(σ).
ii) When the investment good sector is characterized by constant social
returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0, while the consumption good sector is char-
acterized by increasing social returns, i.e. 1− βˆ00 − βˆ10 < 0, consider σ∗ as
defined by (20) and the critical value g¯ as given in Theorem 1ii). For any
g ∈ (0, g¯) and σ ∈ [0, σ∗), there exists a bound γ(σ) > 0 such that the steady
state is locally indeterminate if
9See Nishimura and Venditti [16] for discrete-time models and Garnier, Nishimura and
Venditti [8] for continuous-time models.
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b < 0, bˆ > − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β2b)]
βˆ00[δ+g(1−β2)]
and γ > γ(σ).
iii) When the investment good sector is characterized by increasing social
returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 < 0, while the consumption good sector is char-
acterized by constant social returns, i.e. 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0, consider σ and
σ¯ as given in Theorem 2iii). There exist  > 0, γ(σ) > 0 and γ¯(σ) > γ(σ)
such that for any βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ) and σ ∈ (σ, σ¯), the steady state is
locally indeterminate if
b < (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(1−βˆ11)g , bˆ ∈
(
− (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
βˆ11β11g
, βˆ01β11δ
βˆ00βˆ11(δ+g)
)
and γ ∈ [0, γ(σ)) ∪ (γ¯(σ),+∞).
Theorem 3 shows that as soon as the investment good sector is character-
ized by constant social returns, the existence of local indeterminacy is based
on a capital intensity reversal between the private and the social levels, a
large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and a
low enough elasticity of the labor supply. On the contrary, when the invest-
ment good sector is characterized by slightly increasing social returns, local
indeterminacy requires intermediary values for the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution in consumption but extreme values for the elasticity of the
labor supply. In other words, local indeterminacy is ruled out for interme-
diary values of γ. This result explains why all the literature with increasing
social returns only focusses on configurations with γ close enough to zero.
The occurrence of saddle-point stability as γ is increased has suggested that
local indeterminacy would require a large elasticity of the labor supply as in
aggregate models. However, we prove that this is not true as indeterminacy
also arises when the labor supply is weakly elastic. Notice also that the
consideration of a low elasticity of labor supply appears to be much more
empirically plausible as shown by Blundell and McCurdy [7].
Remark : In case i) of Theorems 1 and 3 we provide necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for local indeterminacy as we are able to apply a geometrical
methodology initially introduced by Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder [10].10
10See Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [9] for details.
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Indeed, under constant social returns in both sectors, the determinant D can
be obtained as a linear function of the trace T when σ or γ is varied. On the
contrary, as soon as increasing social returns to scale are introduced in one
of the two sectors, the complexity of the formulation prevents from having a
simple relationship between D and T . That is why we provide only sufficient
conditions.
4 Concluding comments
We have considered a two-sector economy with CES technologies containing
sector-specific externalities and additively separable CES preferences defined
over consumption and leisure. We have discussed the existence of local
indeterminacy depending on the returns to scale at the private and social
level. Two basic configurations have been explored: constant social and
decreasing private returns to scale as in Benhabib and Nishimura [5], or
increasing social and constant private returns to scale as in Benhabib and
Farmer [2, 3].
First we have shown that when labor is inelastic, for any configuration
of the returns to scale, local indeterminacy is obtained if there is a capital
intensity reversal between the private and the social levels. We have then
proved the robustness of this condition in particular when the social returns
to scale are increasing.
Second, we have shown that when labor is infinitely elastic, saddle-point
stability is obtained as soon as the investment good sector has constant
social returns. On the contrary, if the investment good sector has increasing
social returns, local indeterminacy may arise provided the consumption good
is capital intensive at the social level and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption admits intermediary values.
Finally, we have proved that local indeterminacy requires a low elasticity
of labor when the investment good has constant social returns, but requires
either low enough or large enough elasticity of labor when the investment
good has increasing social returns. This last result clearly shows that the
conditions for the existence of local indeterminacy are strongly affected by
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the precise assumptions made on the returns to scale in the investment good
sector.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Maximizing the profit subject to the private technologies (1) gives the first
order conditions
pjβijyj/xij = wi, i, j = 0, 1 (22)
Considering the steady state with y1 = gx1 and w1 = (δ + g)p1, we get
x11 = β11δ+ggx1 (23)
Using the social production function (2) for the investment good we derive
x01 =
(
β11
δ+g
)− βˆ11
βˆ01 (gx1)
1−βˆ11
βˆ01 (24)
and thus
x01
x11
=
(
β11
δ+g
)− βˆ01+βˆ11
βˆ01 (gx1)
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
βˆ01 (25)
From x1 = x10 + x11 we derive
x10 = x1
(
1− β11δ+gg
)
(26)
Finally we easily obtain from (22):
β10β01
β00β11
= x01x11
x10
x00
⇔ x10x00 =
β10β01
β00β11
(
β11
δ+g
) βˆ01+βˆ11
βˆ01 (gx1)
βˆ01+βˆ11−1
βˆ01 (27)
so that, using (26):
x00 =
(
1− β11δ+gg
)
β00β11
β10β01
(
β11
δ+g
)− βˆ01+βˆ11
βˆ01 g
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
βˆ01 x
1−βˆ11
βˆ01
1
(28)
Considering (25), (27) and x00 + x01 = `, x1 = x10 + x11, we get
x∗1 =
“
`∗ β10β01
β00β11
” βˆ01
1−βˆ11
“
β11
δ+g
” βˆ01+βˆ11
1−βˆ11
g
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
1−βˆ11
“
1− β11
δ+g
gb
” βˆ01
1−βˆ11
≡ (`∗)
βˆ01
1−βˆ11 κ∗ (29)
with b given in Proposition 2. Equation (22) for i = 1 and j = 0 gives
w1 = β10x
βˆ00
00 x
βˆ10−1
10
(30)
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Considering (27), (29) and the fact that w1 = (δ + g)p1 implies
p∗1 =
β10
δ+g
(
1− β11δ+gg
)βˆ00+βˆ10−1 (β00β11
β10β01
)βˆ00 ( β11
δ+g
)− βˆ00(βˆ01+βˆ11)
βˆ01 g
βˆ00(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)
βˆ01
× (κ∗)
βˆ00(1−βˆ11)−βˆ01(1−βˆ10)
βˆ01 (`∗)
βˆ00(1−βˆ11)−βˆ01(1−βˆ10)
1−βˆ11
The substitution of (26) and (28) into (2) gives the expression of c∗, namely
c∗ =
(
1− β11δ+gg
)βˆ00+βˆ10 (β00β11
β10β01
)βˆ00 ( β11
δ+g
)− βˆ00(βˆ01+βˆ11)
βˆ01 g
βˆ00(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)
βˆ01
× (κ∗)
βˆ00(1−βˆ11)+βˆ01βˆ10
βˆ01 (`∗)
βˆ00(1−βˆ11)+βˆ01βˆ10
1−βˆ11
≡ χ∗(`∗)
βˆ00(1−βˆ11)+βˆ01βˆ10
1−βˆ11
Finally, using (22), (28) and (29) into (10) gives
(`∗)
1+γ− (1−σ)βˆ00(1−βˆ11b)
1−βˆ11
A =
βˆ00(χ∗)1−σ
1− β11
δ+g
g
β10β01
β00β11
(
β11
δ+g
) βˆ01+βˆ11
βˆ01 g
βˆ01+βˆ11−1
βˆ01 (κ∗)
βˆ11−1
βˆ01
As ` ∈ (0, 1), let us consider a value l¯ ∈ (0, 1). It follows therefore that if
A = A∗ with
A∗ =
1− β11
δ+g
g
βˆ00(χ∗)1−σ
β00β11
β10β01
(
β11
δ+g
)− βˆ01+βˆ11
βˆ01 g
1−βˆ01−βˆ11
βˆ01 (κ∗)
1−βˆ11
βˆ01 (l¯)
1+γ− (1−σ)βˆ00(1−βˆ11b)
1−βˆ11
then `∗ = l¯ and the result follows.
5.2 Computation of D(σ, γ) and T (σ, γ)
Consider the expressions (18) of the Trace and Determinant, and let y0 =
c. We need therefore to compute the following derivatives of y and w,
namely: ∂c/∂x1, ∂c/∂p1, ∂y1/∂x1, ∂y1/∂p1, ∂w0/∂x1, ∂w0/∂p1, ∂w1/∂x1
and ∂w1/∂p1. We use a procedure by substitution starting from the total
differenciations of the factor-price frontier and the factor market clearing
equation given in Lemmas 2 and 4. Solving equation (8) in Lemma 4 with
dx1 = 0, we get the derivatives of the wage rate and of the rental rate with
respect to the price of investment good:
dw0
dp1
= −
aˆ10
»
βˆ01+βˆ11−(1−βˆ01−βˆ11) p1y1
dy1
dp1
+(1−βˆ00−βˆ10) βˆ11
βˆ10
p1
c
dc
dp1
–
aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
dw1
dp1
=
aˆ00
»
βˆ01+βˆ11−(1−βˆ01−βˆ11) p1y1
dy1
dp1
+(1−βˆ00−βˆ10) βˆ01
βˆ00
p1
c
dc
dp1
–
aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
(31)
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Similarly, solving equation (8) in Lemma 4 with dp1 = 0, we get the deriva-
tives of the wage rate and the rental rate with respect to the stock of capital
dw0
dx1
= −
aˆ01
»
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10) βˆ11
βˆ10
p1
c
dc
dx1
−(1−βˆ01−βˆ11) p1y1
dy1
dx1
–
aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
dw1
dx1
=
aˆ00
»
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10) βˆ01
βˆ00
p1
c
dc
dx1
−(1−βˆ01−βˆ11) p1y1
dy1
dx1
–
aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
(32)
Notice that if we assume constant social returns as in Benhabib and
Nishimura [5], then 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0. It follows
that the rental rate only depends on the price of the investment good as
dw1/dx1 = dw0/dx1 = 0. Moreover, we derive from (31) that the deriva-
tives dw1/dp1 and dw0/dp1 depend on the capital intensity difference across
sectors at the social level and correspond to the Stolper-Samuelson effects.
Consider now equation (4) in Lemma 2. We easily derive from the defi-
nition of input coefficients at the private level (3) that
∂a0j
∂w0
= −a0jw0 ,
∂a1j
∂w1
= −a1jw1 ,
∂ai1
∂p1
= ai1p1 (33)
Moreover, we derive from the factor market clearing equation given in
Lemma 1 that
w1 = aˆ00aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
p
βˆ00
[
βˆ11βˆ00 − βˆ10βˆ01
]
w0 = aˆ10aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
p
βˆ10
[
βˆ11βˆ00 − βˆ10βˆ11
] (34)
Substituting these expressions into (4) and solving for the derivatives of the
two ouput levels with respect to the price of investment good under the
restriction dx1 = 0, we get after tedious but straightforward algebra:
dc
dp1
= − TD
{
Tˆ
w0w1
(βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`)
− d`dp1
[
a11 + Tˆ aˆ00 p1x1w1y1 (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
]}
dy1
dp1
= TD
{
Tˆ
w0w1c
[
(βˆ00a00x1 + βˆ10a10`)c+ x1`(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)
]
− d`dp1
[
a10 − Tˆ aˆ01 x1w1c(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)
]}
− y1p1
(35)
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with T = (a11a00 − a10a01)−1, Tˆ = (aˆ11aˆ00 − aˆ10aˆ01)−1 and
D = 1 + T Tˆp1w0w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(βˆ01a01x1 + βˆ11a11`)y1
+ (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)(βˆ00a00x1 + βˆ10a10`)c
+ x1`(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
] (36)
Substituting these expressions into (31) we get
dw0
dp1
= − TˆD
{
aˆ10 − Tw1c(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)a01x1
+ d`dp1
Tp1
w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10a10c+ (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a11y1
+ x1(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
]}
dw1
dp1
= TˆD
{
aˆ00 + Tw0c(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)a11`
+ d`dp1
Tp1
w0cy1
[
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00a10c+ (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01a11y1
]}
(37)
Proceeding similarly, substituting expressions (33) and (34) into (4) and
solving for the derivatives of the two ouput levels with respect to the stock
of capital under the restriction dp1 = 0, we now get:
dc
dx1
= −Ta01
{
1 + x1w1
dw1
dx1
− a11a01
(
d`
dx1
+ `w0
dw0
dx1
)}
dy1
dx1
= Ta00
{
1 + x1w1
dw1
dx1
− a10a00
(
d`
dx1
+ `w0
dw0
dx1
)} (38)
Substituting these two expressions into (32) and solving for the derivatives
of the wage rate and the rental rate with respect to the capital stock yields
dw0
dx1
= T Tˆp1w1cy1
{
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a01y1 + (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10a00c
− d`dx1
[
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a11y1 + (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10a10c
+ x1(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
]}
dw1
dx1
= − T Tˆp1w0cy1
{
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01a01y1 + (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00a00c
+ `(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
− d`dx1
[
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01a11y1 + (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00a10c
]}
(39)
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Finally, substituting these two expressions back in (38), we obtain
dc
dx1
= − TD
{
a01 − Tˆ p1w0w1y1 (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10`
− d`dx1
[
a11 + Tˆ p1w0w1y1 (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00x1
]}
dy1
dx1
= TD
{
a00 + Tˆ p1w0w1c(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11`
− d`dx1
[
a10 − Tˆ p1w0w1c(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01x1
]}
(40)
Notice that if we assume constant social returns, i.e. 1−βˆ00−βˆ10 = 1−βˆ01−
βˆ11 = 0, then these derivatives correspond to the Rybczynski effects either
when labor is inelastic, i.e. γ = +∞, or when the utility function is linear
with respect to consumption, i.e. σ = 0, as in these two cases d`/dx1 = 0
(see (42) below).
We have finally to derive the expressions of d`/dx1 and d`/dp1. Total
differenciation of equation (10) gives:
γd` = `w0
(
dw0
dx1
dx1 + dw0dp1 dp1
)
− σ `c
(
dc
dx1
dx1 + dcdp1dp1
)
(41)
Assume first that dp1 = 0. We then get:
d`
dx1
= `γ
(
1
w0
dw0
dx1
− σc dcdx1
)
(42)
Substituting dw0/dx1 from (39) and dc/dx1 from (40) in (42) gives
d`
dx1
= `γ
T
DF
{
σ a01c +
Tˆ p1
w0w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a01y1
− (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10(σ`− a00c)
]} (43)
with
F = 1 + `TγD
{
σ a11c +
Tˆ p1
w0w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)(σβˆ00x1 + βˆ10a10c)
+ (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a11y1 + x1(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
]} (44)
Assume finally that dx1 = 0. We then get
d`
dp1
= `γ
(
1
w0
dw0
dp1
− σc dcdp1
)
(45)
Substituting dw0/dp1 from (37) and dc/dp1 from (35) in (45) gives
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d`
dp1
= `γ
T Tˆ
DF
{
1
w0w1c
[
σ(βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`) + (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)a01x1
]
− aˆ10Tw0
]} (46)
The expressions of D(σ, γ) and T (σ, γ) can be obtained after substitution
of (35), (37), (39), (40), (43) and (46) into (18).
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let γ = +∞. We then conclude from (43), (44) and (46) that d`/dx1 =
d`/dp1 = 0 and F = 1. We may also derive useful expressions for the wage
rate and the rental rate for capital. Indeed, using the first order conditions
(22), the expression of the stationary agregate capital stock (29) with `∗ = 1,
(26) and (28) we get
w0 = cβ00
δ+g(1−β11b)
δ+g(1−β11)
w1 = cx1β10
δ+g
δ+g(1−β11)
(47)
i) If 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0, then D = 1 and dω0/dx1 =
dω1/dx1 = 0. The proof of this result is provided in Garnier, Nishimura and
Venditti [9]. Notice that the critical bound σ∗ is the value of σ such that
E = 0, and is equal to
σ∗ = c
∗
p∗1(∂c/∂p1)
(48)
From (35), we get
dc
dp1
= − T Tˆw0w1 (βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`) (49)
Using (47), we then derive
σ∗ = − (β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]
βˆ00β10β01(δ+g)+βˆ10β00β11[δ+g(1−β11b)] ≡ σˆ (50)
ii) Assume now that 1− βˆ00 − βˆ10 < 0 and 1− βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0. As b < 0
and bˆ > 0 we get T Tˆ < 0 and thus D > 0. Consider the partial derivative
dy1/dx1 as given in (40). Using the definition of input coefficients at the
social level (5) we get with `∗ = 1:
dy1
dx1
= TDc
{
a00c+
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11
βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01
}
From (27) we know that
a11a00
a10a01
= βˆ00βˆ11
βˆ10βˆ01
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From Lemma 1 we also derive that at the steady state a10c = x1(1− ga11).
But we know from (23), (25) and (29) that
a11 = β11δ+g ,
a01
a11
=
(
β11
δ+g
)− 1
βˆ01
and
x∗1 =
“
β10β01
β00β11
”“
β11
δ+g
” 1
βˆ01“
1− β11
δ+g
gb
” (51)
We then get from all this and Proposition 2
dy1
dx1
= TDc
{
δ+g(1−β11)
δ+g(1−β11b) +
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)
bˆβˆ00
}
As b < 0 we have T < 0. It follows that dy/dx1 < 0 if
bˆ > − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β11b)]
βˆ00[δ+g(1−β11)] ≡ bˆ (52)
Consider the partial derivative dw1/dp1 as given in (37). We know that
aˆ00 = βˆ00β00a00 =
βˆ00
β00
a10a01
a11
βˆ00βˆ11
βˆ10βˆ01
Proceeding as previously we then derive
dw1
dp1
= TˆDcβ00
{
βˆ00
δ+g(1−β11)
δ+g(1−β11b) +
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)
b
}
Using the steady state relationships (15) we get
δ + g − dw1dp1 =
δ+g
Dc
{
Dc− w0
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β00
[
βˆ00
δ+g(1−β11)
δ+g(1−β11b) +
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)
b
]}
It follows then from (47)
δ + g − dw1dp1 =
δ+g
D
{
D − 1
βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01
[
βˆ00 +
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β11b)]
b[δ+g(1−β11)]
]}
(53)
From (36) we get
D = 1 + 1−βˆ00−βˆ10
(β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
[
βˆ01β01
w1x1
c + βˆ11β11
w0
c
]
We finally derive from (47)
D = 1 +
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[βˆ01(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ11[δ+g(1−β11b)]]
b(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]
(54)
Substituting this expression into (53) finally gives after simplifications:
δ + g − dw1dp1 = −
(δ+g)βˆ01
D(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01) < 0
as bˆ < 0.
Consider the partial derivative dw1/dx1 as given in (39). We get
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dw1
dx1
= − T Tˆp1w0cy1 (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01a01y1
As b < 0, bˆ > 0 and thus T Tˆ < 0 we conclude that dw1/dx1 < 0.
Consider the partial derivative dy1/dp1 as given in (35). We get:
dy1
dp1
=
(δ+g)
h
βˆ00β00+βˆ10β10
w0
w1x1
+
w0
c
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)
i
D(β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
x1
p1
− g x1p1
Using again (47), we obtain
dy1
dp1
=
β00[βˆ00[δ+g(1−β11)](δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)][δ+g(1−β11)]+(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β11b)](δ+g)]
D(β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]
x1
p1
− g x1p1
=
β00[−(δ+g)(1−b)βˆ00β11g+[δ+g(1−β11b)]βˆ10β11g+[δ+g(1−β11b)](δ+g)]
D(β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]
x1
p1
− g x1p1
Notice then that if g = 0, we get
dy1
dp1
= β00δ
D(β00β11−β10β01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
x1
p1
< 0
Therefore, there exists g¯ > 0 such that when g ∈ (0, g¯), dy1/dp1 < 0.
Let us then assume that σ ∈ [0, σ∗), with σ∗ as defined by (48) so that
E > 0. Using (49), (50) and (54) we derive that
σ∗ = σˆ − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[βˆ01(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ11[δ+g(1−β11b)]]
βˆ00(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)]
(55)
From all these results we conclude that if b < 0, bˆ > bˆ with bˆ as defined
by (52), g ∈ (0, g¯) and σ ∈ [0, σ∗), then D(σ,+∞) > 0.
Notice now from (35) and (40) that
dc
dp1
= − TD Tˆw0w1 (βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`) > 0, dcdx1 = − TDa01 > 0
As σ ∈ [0, σ∗) we derive from (18) that
T (σ,+∞) < T (σ¯,+∞) = 1E
{
δ + g − ∂w1∂p1 + 1∂c/∂p1 ∂c∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
}
< 0 (56)
The result follows.
iii) Assume finally that 1− βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0 and 1− βˆ01 − βˆ11 < 0. Again,
as b < 0 and bˆ > 0 we get T Tˆ < 0 and thus D > 0. Consider the partial
derivatives as given in (35), (39) and (40). We easily get
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dy1
dp1
= T TˆDw0w1c(βˆ00a00x1 + βˆ10a10`)c−
y1
p1
< 0
dc
dp1
= − T TˆDw0w1 (βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`) > 0
dw1
dx1
= −T Tˆp1w0c (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ01a01 < 0
dy1
dx1
= TDa00 < 0
dc
dx1
= − TD
{
a01 − Tˆ p1w0w1y1 (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10
}
> 0
Consider now the partial derivative dw1/dp1 as given in (37). We derive at
the steady state
δ + g − dw1dp1 =
(δ+g)
D
{
D − βˆ00
βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01
}
From (36) we get
D = 1 + (1−βˆ10−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)g
[
βˆ00β00 + βˆ10β10 w0w1x1
]
Using (47), we obtain after simplifications
D = 1 + (1−βˆ10−βˆ11)
b(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β11g
[
δ + g(1− βˆ10β11b)
]
We then derive
δ + g − dw1dp1 =
(δ+g)
D(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
{
(1−βˆ10−βˆ11)(δ+g)−(1−βˆ11)bβ11g
bβ11g
}
As b < 0, it follows that δ + g − dw1/dp1 < if
b < (1−βˆ10−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(1−βˆ11)β11g ≡ b¯
Let us then assume that σ ∈ [0, σ∗), with σ∗ as defined by (48) so that
E > 0. Using (49), (50) and (54) we derive that
σ∗ = σˆ − δ+g(1−β11)g (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)[δ+g(1−βˆ10β11b)][βˆ00(1−b)(δ+g)+βˆ10[δ+g(1−β11b)]]β11 (57)
From all these results we conclude that if b < b¯, bˆ > 0, and σ ∈ [0, σ∗), then
D(σ,+∞) > 0. The result follows using again (56).
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Let γ = 0. We derive from (43) and (46) that
d`
dx1
= 1
F˜
{
σ a01c +
Tˆ p1
w0w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a01y1
− (1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10(σ`− a00c)
]}
d`
dp1
= Tˆ
F˜
{
1
w0w1c
[
σ(βˆ00a01x1 + βˆ10a11`) + (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)a01x1
]
− aˆ10Tw0
]} (58)
with
F˜ = σ a11c +
Tˆ p1
w0w1cy1
[
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)(σβˆ00x1 + βˆ10a10c)
+ (1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)βˆ11a11y1 + x1(1− βˆ00 − βˆ10)(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)
] (59)
i) Assume that 1− βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0. Consider first the case with 1− βˆ00 −
βˆ10 = 0. It follows that D = 1, dω0/dx1 = dω1/dx1 = 0, F˜ = σa11/c and
thus
d`
dx1
= a01a11 ,
d`
dp1
= Tˆw0a11
[
βˆ00a01x1+βˆ10a11`
w1
− aˆ10cTσ
]
Therefore we derive from (35), (37) and (40)
dc
dp1
− Tˆ aˆ10cσw0 , dw1dp1 = Tˆ aˆ00,
dy1
dx1
= 1a11
We also get from (14)
E = 1 + Tˆ p1aˆ10w0
Using all these results and (18), we find after simplifications
D(σ, 0) = −
“
1−ga11
a11
”
[aˆ00[1−(δ+g)aˆ11]+(δ+g)aˆ10aˆ01]
aˆ11aˆ00+
aˆ10aˆ11w1
w0
< 0
so that indeterminacy is ruled out for any σ ≥ 0.
Consider now the case with 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 < 0. It is easy to show that
a01−(d`/dx1)a11 = 0. As a result we derive from (39) and (40), dw1/dx1 = 0
so that the determinant D(σ, 0) simplifies as
D(σ, 0) = 1E
(
∂y1
∂x1
− g
)(
δ + g − ∂w1∂p1
)
Moreover we get
F˜ = a11c
[
σ + Tˆ p1(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11w0w1
]
Consider then the partial derivative dy1/dx1 as given in (40). We obtain
dy1
dx1
= 1a11 and thus
dy1
dx1
− g = 1−ga11a11 > 0
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Consider now the partial derivative dw1/dp1 as given in (37). We get after
simplifications
dw1
dp1
= Tˆw0
1−βˆ00−βˆ10+σβˆ00
Tˆ p1(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11
w0w1
+σ
and thus
δ + g − dw1dp1 = (δ + g)
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)(βˆ11−1)+σ[βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01−βˆ00]
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11+σ(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
Consider now the partial derivative dc/dp1 as given in (35). We have:
dc
dp1
= − Tˆw0 aˆ10cTˆ p1(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11
w0w1
+σ
and thus
E = 1− σ p1c ∂c∂p1 =
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11+σ[βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01+βˆ10]
(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11+σ(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)
We may then derive that
D(σ, 0) = (δ + g)1−ga11a11
σ[βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01−βˆ00]−(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)(1−βˆ11)
σ[βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01+βˆ10]+(1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11
The numerator will be positive if and only if
σ < (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)(1−βˆ11)
βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01−βˆ00 ≡ σN
while the denominator will be positive if and only if
σ > (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)βˆ11
βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01+βˆ10 ≡ σD
But as 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0, we have σN = σD. It follows therefore that
D(σ, 0) < 0 for any σ ≥ 0.
ii) Assume now that 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 < 0 and thus 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 0.
Consider the partial derivatives as given in (35), (37), (39) and (40). We
easily get
dy1
dp1
= Tˆ
F˜w0w1c
(βˆ10a10c+ σβˆ00x1)− y1p1 , dcdp1 = − TˆF˜w0 aˆ10a11,
dw1
dp1
= σ Tˆ
F˜ c
aˆ00a11
dw1
dx1
= −σ Tˆ p1
F˜w0cy1
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00, dy1dx1 = σF˜ c ,
dc
dx1
= − Tˆ p1
F˜w0w1y1
(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ10
with
F˜ =
σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]+[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)g(δ+g)c
From all these results we can compute
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E =
σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01+βˆ10)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]+[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]+[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
≡ MN
dy1
dx1
− g = g σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ+g(1−β11)]−(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]−[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10N
≡ gMy1/x1N
δ + g − dw1dp1 = (δ + g)
σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01−βˆ00)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]+[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
N
≡ (δ + g)Mw1/p1N
dy1
dp1
= x1g
[δ+g(1−β11)](βˆ01+βˆ11)βˆ10−σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β11g−(δ+g)(βˆ01+βˆ11)βˆ00]
p1N
≡ x1gMy1/p1p1N
dw1
dx1
= −σ w1gx1
(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00g(δ+g)
N
p1
c
dc
dx1
= − p1gx1
(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10g(δ+g)
N
p1
c
dc
dp1
= − βˆ10β11gN
Notice thatM > N , and as bˆ > 0,My1/x1 > 0 whileMw1/p1 < 0. Moreover,
we derive that M > 0 if
bˆ > − (δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)
β11βˆ11g
− βˆ10
βˆ00βˆ11
≡ bˆ1
and
σ > − [δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01+βˆ10)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00 ≡ σ1
while N < 0 if
bˆ > − (δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)
β11βˆ11g
≡ bˆ2
and
σ < − [δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)β11g+(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00 ≡ σ2
Obviously we have bˆ2 > bˆ1 and we can easily show that σ2 > σ1. Notice also
that when bˆ > bˆ2 and σ < σ2 then My1/p1 > 0.
We may now compute the determinant:
D(σ, 0) = g(δ+g)MN
[
My1/x1Mw1/p1 − σ(δ + g)My1/p1(1− βˆ01 − βˆ11)βˆ00
]
(60)
Therefore, there exists 1 > 0 such that D(σ, 0) > 0 if βˆ01+ βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1+ 1),
bˆ > bˆ2 and σ ∈ (σ1, σ2).
Let us now compute the trace. We start with the following:
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h“
∂y1
∂x1
−g
”
+
“
δ+g− ∂w1
∂p1
”i
E =
gMy1/x1+(δ+g)Mw1/p1
M
=
σ[(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ(1+βˆ11)+g]g+δ(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00]+δ[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
M
≡ T1
This expression is then negative if
bˆ > − δ(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)
[δ(1+βˆ11)+g]βˆ11g
≡ bˆ3
and
σ < − δ[δ+g(1−β11)](1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ10
(βˆ00βˆ11−βˆ10βˆ01)[δ(1+βˆ11)+g]g+δ(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)βˆ00 ≡ σ3
with bˆ2 > bˆ3 and σ3 < σ2. Notice also that σ1 < σ3 if
bˆ < δβˆ10βˆ11
(δ+g)βˆ00βˆ11
≡ bˆ4
It follows that there exists 2 > 0 such that bˆ4 > bˆ2 when βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈
(1, 1 + 2). Consider then the second part of the trace:
p∗1
Ec∗
[
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
− ∂c∂p1
(
∂y1
∂x1
− g
)]
=
βˆ10g[β11gMy1/x1−(δ+g)(1−βˆ01−βˆ11)My1/p1 ]
MN ≡ T2
It follows that T2 < 0 if bˆ > bˆ2 and σ ∈ (σ1, σ2). By definition we have
T (σ, 0) = T1 + σT2. Notice that as σ3 < σ2, if σ = σ3, then T1 = 0 but
T (σ, 0) = T2 < 0. On the contrary, if σ = σ2, then N = 0 and T2 = −∞
so that T (σ, 0) = −∞. Therefore, there exists σ˜ ∈ (σ3, σ2] such that when
bˆ ∈ (bˆ2, bˆ4), T (σ, 0) < 0 for any σ < σ˜.
To conclude, let  = min{1, 2}, σ = σ1 and σ¯ = σ˜. Therefore, the
steady state is locally indeterminate if βˆ01+ βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1+ ), bˆ ∈ (bˆ2, bˆ4) and
σ ∈ (σ, σ¯).
5.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the expression E =M/N given in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume
that E > 0. As M > N , this is obtained if either N > 0 or M < 0.
i) Assume first that N > 0, i.e. bˆ > bˆ2 and σ > σ2. As bˆ > 0, we get
My1/x1 > 0 while Mw1/p1 < 0. It follows from (60) that there exists  > 0
such that if βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), D(σ, 0) < 0.
ii) Asume now that M < 0, i.e. either bˆ > bˆ1 and σ < σ1, or bˆ ∈ (0, bˆ1).
Again, as bˆ > 0, we get My1/x1 > 0 while Mw1/p1 < 0. It follows from (60)
that there exists  > 0 such that if βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), D(σ, 0) < 0.
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5.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Using Theorems 1 and 2, we may prove the different subcases of Theorem
3:
i) Let 1 − βˆ00 − βˆ10 = 1 − βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0. The proof of this result is
provided in Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [9]. Notice that the bound σ∗
is given by (50).
ii) Assume now that 1− βˆ00 − βˆ10 < 0 and 1− βˆ01 − βˆ11 = 0. As shown
in Theorem 1ii), when γ = +∞, the steady state is locally indeterminate if
b < 0, bˆ > − (1−βˆ00−βˆ10)[δ+g(1−β11b)]
βˆ00[δ+g(1−β11)] , g ∈ (0, g¯) and σ ∈ [0, σ
∗)
where the bound σ∗ is given by (55). On the contrary, we have proved with
Theorem 2ii) that when γ = 0, the steady state is saddle-point stable for
any σ ≥ 0. The result follows.
iii) Assume finally that 1− βˆ00− βˆ10 = 0 and 1− βˆ01− βˆ11 < 0. As shown
in Theorem 1iii), when γ = +∞ the steady state is locally indeterminate if
b < (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(1−βˆ11)g , bˆ > 0 and σ ∈ [0, σ
∗)
where the bound σ∗ is given by (57). Moreover, as shown in Theorem 2iii),
when γ = 0 the steady state is locally indeterminate if
βˆ00 + βˆ10 ∈ (1, 1 + ), bˆ ∈
(
− (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
βˆ11β11g
, βˆ01β11δ
βˆ00βˆ11(δ+g)
)
and σ ∈ (σ, σ¯)
with  = min{1, 2}, σ = σ1 and σ¯ = σ˜ ∈ (σ3, σ2] as defined in Section 5.4.
We easily derive that there exists 3 > 0 such that σ2 < σ∗ if βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈
(1, 1 + 3). As a result σ¯ < σ∗, and denoting now  = min{1, 2, 3}, it
follows that when βˆ01 + βˆ11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), we may assume simultaneously all
the following restrictions
b < (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
(1−βˆ11)g , bˆ ∈
(
− (1−βˆ01−βˆ11)(δ+g)
βˆ11β11g
, βˆ01β11δ
βˆ00βˆ11(δ+g)
)
(61)
and σ ∈ (σ, σ¯). The question is now to know whether local indeterminacy
may occur for any γ ≥ 0 when the above conditions are satisfied. The
answer is negative. Indeed, when γ = +∞, if σ < σ¯, then as shown in
Section 5.3, E(x∗1, p∗1) > 0. On the contrary, when γ = 0, if bˆ satisfies (61)
and σ ∈ (σ, σ¯), then as shown in Section 5.4, E(x∗1, p∗1) < 0. Notice finally
that when σ ∈ (σ, σ¯), E(x∗1, p∗1) is a continous function of γ. It follows that
there exist intermediary values for γ such that the determinant D(σ, γ) is
negative. The result follows.
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